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Abstract
In this comment, I raise a number of concerns about David Shoemaker’s adoption 
of the quality of will approach in his recent book, Responsibility from the Margins. 
I am not sure that the quality of will approach is given an adequate grounding that 
defends it against alternative models of moral responsibility; and it is unclear what 
the argument is for Shoemaker’s tripartite version of the quality of will approach. 
One possibility that might it with Shoemaker’s text is that the tripartite model is 
meant to be grounded in empirical claims about the structure of encapsulated emo-
tions; but I argue that those empirical claims are not made out, and that regardless it 
is doubtful whether this is the most helpful model of the emotions to deploy in this 
context. In contrast, I propose that the quality of will approach is better defended in 
ethical terms, by reference to the vision of the value of living together as equals (in 
some sense) that is embodied in P.F. Strawson’s picture of the engaged attitude, and 
the emotions involved in it.
Keywords David Shoemaker · P.F. Strawson · Emotions · Moral responsibility · 
Moral appraisal
1  Shoemaker on emotions and the appraisal of quality of will
Shoemaker’s argument with regards to the quality of will approach is an attempt to 
reine and defend a Strawsonian view of moral responsibility. Strawson puts forward 
a sophisticated form of compatibilism, and, although Shoemaker is not interested—
in this book—in defending compatibilism (p. 9), he is interested in the insights with 
which Strawson makes his case. Three key elements of Strawson’s position make 
David Shoemaker has written a wide-ranging and important book, and what I have to say here 
cannot do justice to its many points of interest [D. Shoemaker, Responsibility from the Margins 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014). Page references in the text are to this book.]. In this 
response, I concentrate on its defence of the quality of will approach.
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up what Shoemaker calls the ‘quality of will’ approach: irst, the claim that moral 
responsibility amounts to nothing more than liability to certain emotional reactions, 
and their associated action tendencies; second, that the relevant emotions are ori-
ented around expectations of goodwill, and are occasioned when there is a lack of 
the expected goodwill; and third, that the object of moral responsibility is therefore 
the quality of will, or the conformity of the will to expectations of goodwill (pp. 
7–8).
Shoemaker argues that Strawson’s picture gets into trouble when it is applied to 
‘marginal cases’ of responsibility. In these cases, agents do have a quality of will (p. 
9), and although we do suspend some forms of responsibility-involving emotional 
reactions, we do not simply adopt the objective perspective. Rather, there are some 
responsibility-involving emotional reactions that we continue to have towards mar-
ginal agents. Shoemaker doesn’t think that we should abandon the quality of will 
approach in the face of this problem: rather, he thinks that we should reine it by 
going pluralistic (p. 17). He agrees that moral responsibility amounts to liability 
to emotional reactions that are oriented around expectations of goodwill. But he 
argues that any monistic interpretation of ‘quality of will’ fails to provide ‘an ade-
quate interpretation of our ambivalent responsibility responses to several marginal 
cases’ (p. 14). He therefore claims that there are three diferent types or ‘families’ 
of emotion, oriented around diferent forms of ‘expectation of goodwill,’ and there-
fore having diferent conditions of ittingness (pp. 17–18). Emotions ‘it’ particular 
objects or situations, in the sense that they are responsive to and appropriate to those 
situations; and they dispose the agent to certain kinds of action-responses. It is thus 
through their characteristic objects and through their associated action-tendencies 
that we individuate and ascribe emotions (p. 21). We appraise people in terms of 
their characters (or deep selves), their judgements, and their attitudes, and this is 
because we have three families of emotional response that take these three diferent 
qualities of persons as their objects. These forms of appraisal correspond to three 
versions of responsibility—attributability; answerability; and accountability.
The three families of emotion in which Shoemaker is interested for the purposes of 
responsibility are set out in contrasting pairs, identiied in terms of the objects to which 
they are characteristically directed, and the action-tendencies they typically involve 
(p. 26). For attributability, the contrasting emotion pair is admiration and disdain. 
These emotions take character as their characteristic object. The characteristic action-
tendency of admiration is emulation, while that of disdain is the desire to be superior 
to the other. For answerability, the contrasting emotion pair is pride and agent-regret. 
These emotions take a person’s judgements as their characteristic object. The character-
istic action-tendency of pride is a disposition to reinforce one’s own judgements, while 
that of agent-regret is a disposition to revise those judgements. For accountability, the 
contrasting emotion pair is what Shoemaker calls ‘agential-anger’ and gratitude. These 
emotions take a person’s attitudes as their object. The characteristic action-tendencies 
of agential anger is a disposition to protest against the slight or seek its perpetrator’s 
recognition of its wrongness, while that of gratitude is a disposition to return good-
will to the other. These emotion pairings are taken to be universal and non-cognitive 
‘sentiments’: such sentiments are pan-cultural and encapsulated aspects of our moral 
psychology, which have an undeniable inluence on our conduct, but which are at best 
1 3
Criminal Law and Philosophy 
partially under the control of reason. Shoemaker thinks that this view of the emotions, 
as well as presumably being independently attractive (p. 23), captures what Strawson 
meant in talking about the naturalness of the reactive attitudes and our practices of 
responsibility.
I ind Shoemaker’s pluralism very appealing. I agree with him that there are various 
modes of appraisal of agents, and that moral responsibility is not all-or-nothing. I am 
also inclined to agree that this shows Strawson’s dualism between the engaged and the 
objective perspectives to have been too simple. I also admire Shoemaker’s discussions 
of the di culties of holding marginal agents to expectations in the way characteristic of 
attempting to maintain distinctively human forms of interpersonal relations with them. 
However, I think his discussions of various forms of ‘marginal’ or ‘ambivalent’ respon-
sibility in Part Two are sometimes hampered by his need to it them to the theoreti-
cal machinery of the ‘tripartite model,’ and its associated sentimentalist underpinnings, 
developed in Part One. Despite its attractions, there are problems with that machin-
ery. While the pluralism is correct, the categorisation that Shoemaker presents is too 
cut-and-dried. While there are ways of justifying such a cut-and-dried categorisation—
after all, this is what philosophy is often about in its characteristic ways of stipulating 
ordered schemes and models to it messy data—Shoemaker can’t avail himself of them 
because of his understanding of his project as an investigation of the nature of a set 
of universal, presumably hard-wired, non-cognitive encapsulated emotions. He can’t 
simply stipulate about the nature of these emotion-syndromes in the way that armchair 
philosophers are wont to do in interpreting experience; presumably his grounding for 
claims about the nature of the emotions must be empirical. However, I am not sure that 
he provides such an empirical grounding. And it is not clear that he has arguments to 
show why his categorisation is better than alternative ways of parsing this area.
This introductory note of dissatisfaction sets my agenda for this response. First, I 
will look at some problems with Shoemaker’s categorisation of the realm of respon-
sibility-reactions into three fundamental types of responsibility. Second, I will look 
at problems with Shoemaker’s conception of emotion. And, third, I will introduce a 
distinction between two diferent ways of taking Strawson’s ‘naturalistic’ approach 
forward, suggesting that these problems arise because Shoemaker has taken the 
wrong path. I will suggest that we should interpret Strawson’s appeal to ‘natural-
ness,’ not in terms of the natural sciences, but rather as it is understood in the tradi-
tion of natural law, where what is natural is what is constitutive of some inherently 
good way of living, or mode of relating. This is not because I am a natural law theo-
rist. I am not. But in drawing on the contours of natural law, I point to a neglected 
way of understanding Strawson’s project. A successful understanding of modes of 
responsibility and their associated emotions, I will suggest, must see them as form-
ing part of diferent ethical models of human relations.
2  An alternative to quality of will: the transgression‑guilt model
So, let us turn to some problems with the threefold categorisation for which 
Shoemaker argues. My concern is that the categorisation is too cut-and-dried—
and I am not sure what the status is of Shoemaker’s arguments for carving up the 
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terrain as he does. One way of focusing this concern is to ask how Shoemaker 
would argue for his set of categories as against someone who proposed an alter-
native vocabulary of responsibility reactions. We can illustrate these worries by 
looking at one such alternative. My point is not to argue in favour of this alter-
native myself, but simply to represent it as a viable possibility that disputes or 
rejects the Shoemaker/Strawson focus on quality of will, and then to ask what 
Shoemaker can say to show his own way of approaching matters to be superior. 
The alternative in which I am interested is what I will call a ‘transgression-guilt’ 
model of responsibility. The key thing that matters for responsibility, according 
to this model, is the intentional commission of prohibited actions, and for which, 
once the intentional nature of the action is established, any further question about 
the nature of the underlying quality of will is irrelevant. The view I am imagin-
ing sees the intentional commission of certain actions as causing guilt (the moral 
state, not the emotion), which then must be expiated through some form of atone-
ment. The focus on intentional action rules out holding people responsible for 
what they do accidentally. So this transgression-guilt model can accommodate 
Strawson’s example in which we react diferently depending on whether a person 
stands on your hand deliberately or by accident. But this model denies that exam-
ples like Strawson’s show that the target of our reactive attitudes is only quality 
of will. The focus on this model is simply intentional action: intentional action is 
suicient to commit transgressions that incur guilt.
Is this model part of our moral consciousness? The transgression-guilt model of 
responsibility might be seen in Oedipus, who attracted guilt and pollution by killing 
a man and marrying a woman who turned out to be his father and mother. The crim-
inal law might also appear to have this kind of structure. In the criminal law, inten-
tion and knowledge are essential to liability, but these requirements are construed 
in minimal terms (it isn’t always necessary that one intended the action under the 
description according to which it was wrong, or that one knew what one was doing 
in the demanding sense that one knew that it was wrong); and, for the purposes of 
determining culpability in criminal law, it is a commonly repeated dictum that it is 
intention not motive that matters. Is this model covered by one among Shoemaker’s 
variety of quality of will approaches, in particular answerability, or quality of judge-
ment? Perhaps, at least in the minimal sense that each intentional action might be 
said to be done for reasons, and hence the assessment of an action as intentional 
involves some judgement that it was done for reasons that the agent took to support 
that action (at least insofar as action ‘aims at the good’). But the view I am imagin-
ing is unlike Shoemaker’s category—and hence represents a genuine alternative to 
it—on the basis that it involves no concern with the particular nature of the reasons 
for which the agent acted. As long as the action can intelligibly be seen as the prod-
uct taking themselves to have justifying reasons, it can be seen as intentional. Thus, 
unlike the answerability model, the content of those reasons is irrelevant to whether 
the agent attracts guilt for having acted in that way. The only question of interest for 
the transgression-guilt model is the agent’s judgement that this kind of action was 
permissible (when in fact it was impermissible). As long as it can be established that 
the agent made this judgement, this is suicient for guilt without the presence of any 
other quality of will.
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Of course, the criminal law is a special, and somewhat artiicial, case; and my 
Oedipus example might be said to be archaic. But the question is whether there 
might not be some form of liability—part of our moral consciousness, and our 
moral phenomenology—that takes this form, as Bernard Williams argued there is 
in Shame and Necessity.1 Williams discusses the example of Telemachus leaving 
a storeroom door open, giving Odysseus’s enemies access to armour and weapons. 
Telemachus is responsible, and must take responsibility, for the consequences of this 
failure regardless of any failure of concern, or regard, or any erroneous judgements 
shown in the action. And in ‘Moral Luck,’ Williams famously puts forward the 
example of the lorry driver who hits a child despite keeping to the speed limit and 
doing everything needful to keep his brakes in order2; Williams insists in this case 
that some form of responsibility is involved in the characteristic forms of emotional 
response and attempts at reparation, even though the lorry driver’s quality of will 
is impeccable. According to the transgression-guilt model, these reactions are what 
we would expect if it is possible to have committed a transgression simply by virtue 
of committing a prohibited intentional action. One way in which an argument that 
such a conception remains part of our moral consciousness might be defended is to 
look at Judith Jarvis Thomson’s claims about liability in self-defence situations.3 For 
Thomson, one can incur liability to be harmed quite innocently, without any repre-
hensible quality of will, by having unintentionally threatened a bearer of rights—for 
instance, by being pushed over a clif by a villain in such a way that you will kill 
an innocent person if she does not kill you irst. Here we might see echoes of the 
conception to which Williams draws our attention: that having entered the zone of 
transgressive action, one changes one’s normative situation, making oneself either 
polluted in such a way that one must expiate what one has done, or at least liable, 
in the sense that the moral boundaries normally protecting one have been signii-
cantly weakened or waived as a result of one’s transgression. The transgression-guilt 
view therefore takes something like Thomson’s model of liability and makes it into a 
model of moral responsibility: perhaps supplementing its case with the thought that, 
once we have accepted Shoemaker’s pluralism about forms of moral responsibil-
ity, there is no principled reason for arguing that the change in normative situation 
brought about by one’s innocent (in the sense of no-fault) but transgressive act is not 
a change in moral responsibility.
As I say, it is not my intention to defend the transgression-guilt view, but only 
to canvass it as a coherent alternative to those who only recognise quality of will. 
However, it doesn’t seem entirely implausible to think that people have rights to be 
treated in certain ways, and that we can incur guilt and obligations to repair if we 
violate those rights, in ways that are characteristic of moral responsibility, even if 
we don’t implicate our quality of will in doing so. If I am having an angry argument 
with my daughter about her staying out too late at night, and, partly as a delaying 
1 B. Williams, Shame and Necessity (London: University of California Press, 1993), p. 50—at the start 
of a chapter entitled ‘Recognising Responsibility.’.
2 B. Williams, ‘Moral Luck,’ in Moral Luck (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), pp. 20–39.
3 J.J. Thomson, ‘Self-Defense,’ Philosophy and Public Affairs 20 (4) (1991), pp. 283–310.
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tactic and partly as a distraction, I glance at my smartphone and see that I have an 
urgent email revealing a damning problem with my work, I might tell her to get the 
hell out and not to bother me. Say also that this is completely out of character for 
me: it was simply the unfortunate combination of circumstances that led to my short 
temper, and didn’t reveal anything in the way of my lasting character traits or regard. 
Nevertheless, I have insulted her and treated her in a way that I should never have—
or, as we might say, as she has a right never to be treated by her father. Some insult-
ing actions, on the view I am imagining, would be transgressions whenever they 
are performed intentionally, regardless of whether attitudes such as lack of regard 
underpin it. That might be because people have rights, in virtue of their status, or 
their place in a relationship such as this one, to be treated with a kind of respect. 
Respect, to develop the idea, might therefore be construed as irreducible to proper 
regard. Proper respect might be in part a matter of performing the right actions, and 
avoiding proscribed actions, regardless of motivation. No matter how out of char-
acter, then, I would have performed a disrespectful act: I would have infringed my 
daughter’s right to certain kinds of treatment. This could be a case in which qual-
ity of judgement is relevant, but like the criminal law, the only way in which my 
judgement is relevant is the fact that I judged—in the moment of decision—that this 
action was permitted me. Of course, a proponent of the quality of will view might 
protest that my action, even if out of character, does manifest an attitude towards my 
daughter, however leeting. But the proponent of the transgression-guilt view might 
ask whether the deep explanation of why I am responsible in this case is really down 
to the fact that I leetingly displayed this attitude—or whether it is not that the fact 
that the attitude is manifested in actions that are inconsistent with the way in which 
my daughter has a right to be treated.
3  How should we argue for the quality of will approach?
My aim here has been to make plausible the possibility that there is a form of moral 
responsibility that involves the attribution of actions to an agent and incurs liability, 
including liability to emotional reactions (reactions to those who insult us and treat 
us with disrespect), but where this does not involve quality of will being the focus 
of responsibility. I suggest it in the spirit of Shoemaker’s pluralism, not as the only 
form of responsibility but as one not covered by his schema. It would therefore be 
a counterexample to Shoemaker’s categorisation. It is not the only possible coun-
terexample. Consider something more character-based. Shoemaker’s own concep-
tualisation of responsibility for character is very rich, involving an assessment of 
one’s deep self. But we can imagine a character-based view that is more austerely 
aretaic. The model I am imagining simply involves an assessment of how good one 
is at being the kind of thing a human being is, and of doing the kinds of things a 
human being characteristically or essentially does. It simply looks at one’s capaci-
ties and performances, and at the probability, based on those capacities, that you 
will act, think, and feel well, as a human being ought to, and grades these capacities 
and performances against an objective scale of human excellence. This view might 
sound in some ways Aristotelian; it might also sound like the Hume of the Enquiry, 
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where he claims that we assess people simply in terms of how useful or agreeable 
their traits are for others and themselves. If we think of that assessment in terms of 
an objective scale for measuring capacities of a human being in terms of usefulness/
agreeableness, and of probabilities that you will do things that are useful/agreeable, 
we get the kind of thing I have in mind. Again this aretaic view does not focus exclu-
sively on quality of will, at least not if this is construed as the person’s ‘deep self’: 
it would consider the person’s ‘deep self’—their rational evaluations and their emo-
tional cares—amongst other properties in determining how a person is likely to act, 
think, and feel, and hence what she is like, and how good she is at being a human 
being. This ‘austere aretaism’ represents another possible counterexample to a qual-
ity of will approach. It is an example of responsibility because it concerns a person’s 
liability to certain reactions, including emotional reactions (on Hume’s view, love 
and hatred, pride and humility).
Now Shoemaker might argue that the transgression-guilt view and austere areta-
ism are implausible alternatives to the quality of will approach. However, if he were 
to do so, he would require a diferent kind of argument from any that appears in 
Responsibility from the Margins. The book’s strategy starts from an assumption that 
quality of will should be our focus, and then defends that approach against the mar-
ginal agents objection; but it does not really motivate the quality of will focus in its 
own right. Therefore, if we were to ask how we should adjudicate a dispute between 
Shoemaker as a proponent of the quality of will view, and a proponent of either the 
transgression-guilt view or austere aretaism, it is not clear that Shoemaker ofers 
us any guidance. Now it might be open to Shoemaker to point out that no book 
can do everything, that it is legitimate to assume the quality of will approach and 
seek to resolve certain questions that it faces, and hence that it is somewhat unfair 
to demand that he should have devoted space to motivating the quality of will view 
against all of its possible opponents. However, if we look at some of the details of 
Shoemaker’s quality of will schema, there is a similar tendency to present contro-
versial issues as cut-and-dried. For instance, it is not entirely clear what status we 
should give to Shoemaker’s arguments for the three ‘syndromes’ that he identiies 
of accountability, answerability, and attributability. Why does he think that there are 
only three basic forms of responsibility? Why does he think that agential anger takes 
as its only focus quality of regard? How would he argue against someone who dis-
puted that? What kinds of arguments would he be drawing upon?
In searching for answers to some of these questions, we might ask how, given the 
rest of the argument, Shoemaker thinks his focus on quality of will, and his threefold 
categorisation, are grounded. Three possibilities are that it is grounded: (1) by an 
empirical investigation into human behaviour, of the sort characteristic of empirical 
psychology; (2) in a kind of irst-personal phenomenology of the agent’s perspective; 
or (3) by normative argument to the efect that the categorisation focuses on those 
capacities that are most important about human beings and that therefore play a cen-
tral role in an attractive form of human relations. The empirical form of ground-
ing is most consistent with Shoemaker’s conception of his own project, and this is 
because of the role he gives to empirically deined non-cognitive and universal sen-
timents in constituting moral responsibility. An explanation for what I am calling the 
‘cut-and-dried’ appearance of the schema might therefore be that Shoemaker thinks 
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that he can bypass the alternative models of responsibility we have just looked at by 
appealing to his project of universal sentimentalism. He might argue, on empirical 
grounds, that there are no such universal human emotions that take as their objects 
transgressions or arête in the sense we have described. However, the book does not 
pursue this kind of empirical inquiry, and therefore does not deliver this argument 
(though it may be intended to?). Its method is more like the phenomenological one. 
However, if we look for a phenomenological argument grounding the adoption of 
the tripartite model that would explain why only these categories of moral responsi-
bility are plausible, and which could be deployed against the transgression-guilt or 
the austere aretaic approach, we won’t ind one.
Shoemaker might protest at this point. He might argue that the application of the 
threefold categorisation in Part Two of his book is an attempt to show that our reac-
tions to particular cases are as the tripartite model predicts. However, the argument 
here is anecdotal, and does not take the form that would be recognised as rigorous in 
empirical psychology. But isn’t it an investigation into our empirical psychology that 
his commitments require?
Alternatively, Shoemaker might claim that he motivates the quality of will 
approach, and his tripartite model, in his claim that we care about the way we 
are treated by our fellow agents; and, he might say, what we thereby care about is 
exhausted by his tripartite categorisation. Strawson’s insight is that we care about 
receiving the good will of others; Shoemaker might say that this involves caring 
about others’ judgements and attitudes towards us, and their character traits inso-
far as these afect us. He might claim that all and only these aspects of a person 
are what we care about when we engage in moral assessment—not those features 
that are captured by the transgression-guilt or austere aretaism models. Or he might 
claim that it is only the quality of will approach that can account for the pattern of 
excuses and exemptions that we intuitively accept. However, I am unconvinced by 
both of those responses, at least if the grounding for their claims about what ‘we’ 
care about is an empirical sentimentalist one. My main line of thought is that the 
pattern of excuses and exemptions that we accept, and our reasons for focusing on 
quality of will (if we do) are more theoretically informed than simply hard-wired 
and universal. Of course, we do not necessarily have an articulate grasp of the the-
ory underpinning our responsibility reactions. But to the extent that we do favour the 
quality of will approach, it is more likely to be because of our grasp of a particular 
ethically loaded view of what is important about agents, and of human relations, into 
which responsibility judgements it.
Thus, an overlooked possibility for defending the quality of will approach is the 
normative approach that above I contrasted with the empirical and phenomenologi-
cal approaches. What is wrong with the transgression-guilt model is to be located 
in ethical reasons of the sort that Martha Nussbaum discusses in her paper ‘Equity 
and Mercy’: that its refusal to ‘look within’ the agent reveals a lack of humanity4; 
what is wrong with the austere aretaic approach is that its grading approach is either, 
as T.M. Scanlon says, a bit pointless, and doesn’t it in with any important human 
4 M. Nussbaum, ‘Equity and Mercy,’ Philosophy and Public Affairs 22 (2) (1993), pp. 83–125.
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interests (how humans measure up in this aretaic sense is a possible object of con-
templation, but not one to which we should devote too much time)5; or because, as 
on Hume’s own view, it is too aggregative and utilitarian, looking at one’s itness to 
bring about desired consequences in a way that would squeeze out more egalitarian 
forms of responsibility, such as those that see us as equals holding one another to 
laws that we have collectively made for ourselves. Applied to Strawson, the norma-
tive argument for the quality of will approach is something like this: the way of see-
ing and interpreting human action that underpins the reactive attitudes is part of a 
much richer form of life than the one—if it were possible—characterised solely by 
the objective attitude. The fundamental argument for a model of responsibility reac-
tions, on this view, is ethical.
4  Shoemaker on emotions as sentiments
My concern, then, is that Shoemaker’s categorisation of forms of responsibility, 
though admirably pluralistic, is not as pluralistic as it could be, and that at present 
it doesn’t have the resources to argue for the way it narrows the ield. I have further 
suggested that the grounding most consistent with Shoemaker’s approach would be 
an empirical one, given his view that sentiments play such a central role in structur-
ing moral responsibility. By contrast, I have proposed that a more satisfying way 
to ground the Strawsonian approach is normative. Could Shoemaker respond that 
his empirical approach is, contrary to my proposal, superior, because it rests on a 
more adequate conception of the emotions? The normative view, he might rightly 
say, does not deny that emotions are involved in, and partly constitutive of, our prac-
tices of moral responsibility. But the normative view takes these emotions to be mal-
leable and essentially penetrable by morally loaded conceptions of what is impor-
tant about humanity, and how human beings should relate to one another, in such a 
way that diferent conceptions of human relations are embodied in diferent families 
or syndromes of emotions. By contrast, Shoemaker might argue that the empirical 
approach he recommends is more in line with a naturalistic approach to the emo-
tions: it is a virtue of his approach, he might argue, that its view of the emotions is in 
line, for instance, with Paul Ekman’s idea of an ‘afect program,’ that is, as evolved 
encapsulated mechanisms rather than culturally elaborated modes of being-in-the-
world.6 However, I am unconvinced that the afect program model of the emotions 
is the one most helpful to appeal to in thinking about moral responsibility from a 
Strawsonian point of view—at least not if it is deployed to the exclusion of the nor-
matively loaded model. Of course, it is true that we have an evolved moral psy-
chology; furthermore, it is implausible to think that our psychology is unafected by 
5 T. M. Scanlon, Moral Dimensions: Permissibility, Meaning and Blame (Cambridge, MA: Belknap 
Press, 2008), p. 127.
6 P. Ekman, ‘Biological and Cultural Contributions to Body and Facial Movement in the Expression of 
Emotions,’ in A.O. Rorty (ed.), Explaining Emotions (London: University of California Press, 1980), pp. 
73–103. See also P. Griiths, What Emotions Really Are (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1997); 
J.J. Prinz, Gut Reactions: A Perceptual Theory of the Emotions (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004).
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the kinds of homeostatic principles that govern our existence as organisms. But our 
evolutionary inheritance has also clearly left what seems from a normative point of 
view to be a wide range of possible variation in emotional vocabularies. Therefore, 
I do not believe that we can rule out the possibility that what we call ‘emotions’ are 
sometimes more than afect programs, and that they sometimes become vehicles for 
moral conceptions that vary across cultures and individuals in a manner correspond-
ing to variance in moral orientation. The question is whether, when we study moral 
responsibility in the way that Shoemaker does, and attempt to explain the varieties 
of such responsibility and the proper objects of the emotions they involve, it is most 
helpful to start from the conception of the emotions as encapsulated or to start with 
a conception of emotions as cognitively penetrable.
I am not sure that Shoemaker has adopted the right conception of the emotions, 
at least for the purposes of developing Strawson’s project in the way he seeks to do. 
Shoemaker doesn’t provide a detailed analysis of what sorts of mental states emo-
tions are. But he does tell us something about what they are not. They are not, for 
instance, states with propositional content. Despite claiming that they lack proposi-
tional content, however, Shoemaker is happy to claim that the emotions he is talk-
ing about follow patterns of logical relations. For instance, admiration and disdain 
seem to be discussed as not just psychological but also logical opposites: that is, 
they are opposites in the sense that they portray their object in contradictory ways, 
and that it would be more than merely psychologically uncomfortable to hold both 
attitudes towards the same feature at the same time. Admiration would involve some 
judgement that the person is high on some scale, for instance, and disdain, that they 
are low. It follows that one would be contradicting oneself if one experienced both 
towards the same person, in respect of the same qualities, without having altered 
one’s view of those qualities. However, Shoemaker cannot avail himself of that 
explanation of why these emotions are opposites, since he has rejected the idea that 
emotions have propositional content, or that they are partly constituted by claims 
about the nature of their objects. Only if they have content that can enter into logical 
relations can attitudes be logically contradictory. For Shoemaker, though, emotions 
are non-propositional afective and motivational states that are not accountable to 
any logical relations. The best that he could do is to say that empirically it is the case 
for creatures like us that admiration and disdain tend not to co-occur; and I’m not 
entirely sure that that is satisfactory.
Furthermore, Shoemaker sometimes talks about irst- and third-personal versions 
of these emotions. However, that these are forms of the same emotion is an assump-
tion that it is natural to make only if we accept that emotions have propositional con-
tent, and that, in this case, there is a single, intersubjectively accessible content to 
which there can be a number of diferent ‘attitudes,’ depending on one’s relation to 
the content—for instance, depending on whether the attitude is one’s own or some-
one else’s. If he has really given up on the idea of such propositional content, Shoe-
maker would have to ind an alternative way of explaining the connection between 
irst- and third-personal versions of the emotions, on which he relies.
Another issue where Shoemaker helps himself to cognitivist terminology without 
explaining how his non-cognitivist view is entitled to it concerns conditions of ‘it-
tingness,’ a notion to which he appeals widely. If emotions are non-cognitive states, 
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then they may be triggered by characteristic causes; but the idea of conditions of it 
is normally thought to go beyond such triggering. It is normally thought to involve 
reasons for emotions, where these reasons are reasons of warrant, and not merely 
motivating or explanatory reasons. Reasons of it do not amount to all-things-con-
sidered justiications,7 but they do go beyond triggering. They involve some sense 
of representational appropriateness—appropriateness to the situation, in virtue of 
how the emotion represents the situation as being. But reasons for warrant go along 
with the cognitivist picture of the emotions that Shoemaker rejects. So, the question 
is: how can emotional states that are non-cognitive, and do not represent situations 
in terms of propositional content, be responsive to reasons of warrant? It might be 
thought that such states can only be so responsive in virtue of having content that 
is responsive by virtue of representing or itting the situation. But then emotions 
must have some sort of representational content … and hence propositional content? 
Well, maybe an appeal to propositional content is not needed here, but again, we 
need Shoemaker to spell out his non-cognitivist alternative in more detail to show 
how it entitles him to say the things he does.
Of course, it is true that recalcitrance is an objection with which any broadly cog-
nitivist account of the emotions must deal. But Shoemaker leaps too quickly to the 
conclusion that it is decisive. One obvious response to the recalcitrance challenge 
would be to suggest that only a narrow range of emotions are encapsulated in the 
way that Shoemaker claims, and that higher emotions such as those he is dealing 
with are much more than afect programs, and hence are more responsive to context 
than he allows. Another thing that a cognitivist might do is to ind ‘partners in guilt,’ 
by pointing out that even beliefs can lag behind evidence in ways that suggest that 
emotions are not necessarily diferent in kind from even paradigmatically cognitive 
states. Yet another response might be to argue that the parallel that those who talk 
about encapsulation want to draw between emotions and perception only leads us 
decisively away from cognitivism if we assume a causal theory of perception; a the-
ory of perception more sympathetic to Kant would take our cognitive capacities to 
be active in perception (and, perhaps, by extension in emotion) right from the start.
If we take a more cognitivist view of the reactive attitudes, it makes it at least 
possible that those attitudes may embody a certain theoretically informed, ethical, or 
even ideological view of human beings, their capacities, and their place in the world. 
On this normative view, the emotions tied to responsibility are not brute hard-wired 
reactions lacking propositional content, but rather are ways in which human beings 
actively make sense of their world, implicating claims about the nature of that world 
and what is important in it. Our range of emotions gives an insight into what we take 
to be important, and therefore involves a commitment to certain values, and inter-
sects with our more explicit attempts to account for what matters. In holding people 
responsible, on this view, one experiences emotions that involve treating them as 
creatures of a certain sort, in relations of certain sorts, and where those relations 
are in part upheld by the responsibility interactions in which we are engaged. In 
7 J. D’Arms and D. Jacobson, ‘The Moralistic Fallacy: On the “Appropriateness” of Emotions,’ Philoso-
phy and Phenomenological Research 61 (1) (2000), pp. 65–90.
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experiencing the range of emotions that go with holding people responsible, on this 
view, we commit ourselves to a range of ethical claims, not just about what we hold 
people responsible for, but how we hold them responsible. What we say about peo-
ple and how they matter difers if our main reactions to them are admiration and 
disdain than if they are gratitude and indignation: for instance, the latter involves 
seeing someone as in community with one, accountable to shared rationally acces-
sible standards or laws, whereas admiration and disdain imply distance. They it into 
diferent forms of human relations. As I have noted, much more must be said about 
this ethical route to make it plausible. But I hope to have done enough to establish it 
as an alternative to Shoemaker’s approach that is worth thinking about.
5  Conclusion
In this comment, I have raised a number of concerns about Shoemaker’s adoption of 
the quality of will approach. I am not sure that the quality of will approach is given 
an adequate grounding that defends it against alternative models of moral responsi-
bility; and it is unclear what the argument is for the tripartite model. One possibility 
is that the tripartite model is meant to be grounded in empirical claims about the 
structure of encapsulated emotions; but I have argued that those empirical claims 
are not made out, and that regardless it is doubtful whether this is the most helpful 
model of the emotions to deploy in this context. In contrast, I have proposed that the 
Strawsonian approach must be defended in ethical terms, by reference to a vision of 
the value of living together as equals (in some sense) that is embodied in Strawson’s 
picture of the engaged attitude, and the emotions it involves.
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